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Abstract
The Philippines confirmed its first epidemic of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) on
August 11, 2017. It ended in November of 2017. Despite the successful management of the
epidemic, reemergence is a continuous threat. The aim of this study was to conduct a math-
ematical model to assess the spatial transmission of HPAI among poultry farms in Central
Luzon. Different control strategies and the current government protocol of 1 km radius pre-
emptive culling (PEC) from infected farms were evaluated. The alternative strategies include
0.5km PEC, 1.5km PEC, 2 km PEC, 2.5 km PEC, and 3 km PEC, no pre-emptive culling
(NPEC). The NPEC scenario was further modeled with a time of government notification set
at 24hours, 48 hours, and 72 hours after the detection. Disease spread scenarios under
each strategy were generated using an SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed)
stochastic model. A spatial transmission kernel was calculated and used to represent all
potential routes of infection between farms. We assumed that the latent period occurs
between 1–2 days, disease detection at 5–7 days post-infection, notification of authorities at
5–7 days post-detection and start of culling at 1–3 days post notification. The epidemic sce-
narios were compared based on the number of infected farms, the total number of culled
farms, and the duration of the epidemic. Our results revealed that the current protocol is
the most appropriate option compared with the other alternative interventions considered
among farms with reproductive ratio (Ri) ! 1. Shortening the culling radius to 0.5 km
increased the duration of the epidemic. Further increase in the PEC zone decreased the
duration of the epidemic but may not justify the increased number of farms to be culled.
Nonetheless, the no-pre-emptive culling (NPEC) strategy can be an effective alternative to
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the current protocol if farm managers inform the government immediately within 24 hours of
observation of the presence of HPAI in their farms. Moreover, if notification is made on days
1–3 after the detection, the scale and length of the outbreak have been significantly reduced.
In conclusion, this study provided a comparison of various control measures for confronting
the spread of HPAI infection using the simulation model. Policy makers can use this informa-
tion to enhance the effectiveness of the current control strategy.
Introduction
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is a major concern in the poultry industry. It is
included amongst the list of notifiable terrestrial and aquatic animal diseases being monitored
by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) [1]. Massive mortalities due to infection
and eventual culling characterize HPAI epidemic. Globally, HPAI outbreaks caused the loss of
approximately 120 million birds from January 2013 to June 2018 [2]. There were 16 million
birds killed in the 1999–2000 Italy outbreaks. Around 30 and 17 million birds destroyed in the
epidemics experienced in the Netherlands and Canada, respectively [3]. The H5N6 HPAI out-
break in the Philippines resulted in the culling of around 400,000 birds. The introduction of
Avian Influenza in the country was confirmed by the Philippine government on August 11,
2017. Commercial poultry farms in barangays San Carlos and Santa Rita of San Luis, Pam-
panga were affected. After a week, cases were confirmed in Nueva Ecija, a province adjacent
to Pampanga. A second wave of the outbreak was reported on November 12, 2017 in Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija. A total of 23 farms were identified to have bird flu infection in the two provinces
from July to November, 2017. Sixteen farms were in Pampanga and seven in Nueva Ecija.
Eight towns in Pampanga were affected (Apalit, Bacolor, Candaba, Lubao, Mabalacat, San
Luis, San Simon, Sto.Tomas) and four towns in Nueva Ecija were included (Cabiao, Jaen, San
Isidro, Zaragosa). During the outbreak, fifteen layer chicken farms, 6 duck farms and 2 quail
farms were infected. An outbreak investigation identified key factors affecting the spread of
the disease among farms including low biosecurity, having multiple species reared on the
farm, no outbreak monitoring system, inability to identify the disease and uncontrolled trade
in poultry commodities.
The disease is zoonotic with a high case fatality rate (CFR). The high CFR of HPAI raised
concerns about the potential emergence of an influenza pandemic [4]. Since the start of the
HPAI H5N1 epidemic in late 2003, 861 human cases and 455 deaths have been reported glob-
ally [1, 5, 6]. With its severe economic consequences and the pandemic potential of HPAI, an
effective control program needs to be implemented upon outbreak confirmation. Generally,
disease spread can be prevented in 3 ways by decreasing (1) the contact rate between animals
through isolation or separation, (2) infectiousness of infected animals by culling or treatment,
and (3) susceptibility of animals via vaccination [7, 8].
The baseline HPAI control strategy in the Philippines consists of culling of birds in infected
farms, movement restrictions and epidemiological tracing of potential transmission contacts.
It also includes the culling of all domestic birds within a 1 km radius from the infected prop-
erty. Pre-emptive culling (PEC) was implemented in the HPAI epidemics in the Netherlands
[9], Canada [3], and Italy [10]. Epidemic simulation results supported the implementation of
the PEC as an additional control measure to better manage the outbreak. Considering the vari-
ation of poultry density across territories, the strategy identified to be the best against HPAI
epidemic in other countries may not be suitable under Philippines’ condition. Hence, there is
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a need to identify an epidemiologically optimal strategy that is adapted to the local poultry
industry. It is challenging to identify which measure can provide the best impact in managing
HPAI epidemics. Without a strong reference in selecting the “best” approach, resistance from
the affected stakeholders will be encountered during its implementation. For instance, the
affected industry stakeholders may ask for a justification of deciding for a 1 km culling radius
rather than a half km. In the absence of scientific evidence in support of a control measure,
public pressure may dictate how an epidemic should be managed. To determine the best strat-
egy, effects from different scenarios should be compared.
Mathematical modeling allows the evaluation of scenarios where real field experiments can-
not be performed such as infecting a farm with HPAI and observing its spread. This method is
a useful tool in simulating outbreaks of infectious diseases [11]. Epidemic simulation models
are used to describe the pattern of disease spread and how different control measures can
change it. For instance, intervention strategies were simulated to strengthen the contingency
plans and programs against foot and mouth disease in Spain [12], Texas, USA [13], and Korea
[14]. For avian influenza, simulation models have been done in Great Britain [15], Netherlands
[16], South Carolina, USA [17], and Italy [18]. In epidemiological studies of HPAI, mathemati-
cal modeling has been used to quantify transmission parameters [7, 19–21] and how the dis-
ease spread in populations [22–24].
In this study, the spread of HPAI in Central Luzon, Philippines was simulated to examine
the effect of the various control strategies on the progression of the epidemic. We compared
outcomes regarding the magnitude and duration of the epidemic among different control
strategies. The findings from this study can be utilized to inform the policymaker for improv-
ing and enhancing the HAPI control programs.
Materials and methods
The study was conducted in Central Luzon, Philippines. The Central Luzon region is com-
posed of 7 provinces including Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and
Zambales (Fig 1). Based on data from the Philippine Statistics Authority, Central Luzon is the
Fig 1. Geographic distribution of poultry farms in central Luzon (CL) in 2018. (a) map of Philippines showing the
location of Central Luzon (CL) in green. (b) distribution of highly pathogenic avian influenza susceptible farms in the
seven provinces of CL.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.g001
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region with the highest number of ducks and duck farms in the country (32.02%) as of January
1, 2019. Moreover, the region shared 68.75% of the total stocks reared in commercial farms
[25]. It also has the largest number of chickens with a 35.9% share of the country’s total pro-
duction over the same period [26].
The HPAI outbreak data was provided by the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Philip-
pines. The poultry farms included in this study were based on the registration records of the
Provincial Veterinary Offices (PVO). Farm profiles (species-specific poultry population and
farm coordinates) were compiled from farm visits conducted throughout the area. Each farm’s
maximum poultry capacity was used in the analysis.
Since registration is only required among commercial operations, therefore, small-scale
poultry operations have not been included in the analysis. While 261 duck farms were regis-
tered, we believe that there were other commercial duck farms outside Pampanga. Although
the number of unregistered quail and duck farms was unknown but this limitation may not be
a serious issue. Compared to the operation of other species, a commercial quail farm does not
require much space, and the transportation of quail eggs to the market can be done in con-
cealed ways such as in vans or the boots of cars.
Model formulation
The dynamics of disease spread in Central Luzon following the introduction of HPAI virus
was estimated using a stochastic SEIR model. In this model, a farm’s transition between each
of the following states was modeled: S, susceptible; E, latently infected (infected but not yet
infectious); I, infectious; and R, removed. Following the rationale of earlier studies [18, 27, 28],
it was reasonable to define the farm as the epidemiological unit since the HPAI virus transmits
rapidly between birds within an infected farm.
A transmission parameter called transmission kernel (h) was used to represent all forms of
disease transmission between susceptible farms [29]. This approach has been used to HPAI
[15, 18, 28, 30, 31] and other infectious animal disease models like FMD [29, 32, 33]. It refers
to the infection hazard posed by an infectious animal from an infected farm to a susceptible
animal of a susceptible farm. It is a function of the Euclidean distance (r) between farms. We
adopted the kernel formulation (Eq 1) from the studies of Boender et al. [34, 35] and Dorigatti
et al. [18]
h rij
⇣ ⌘
à h0Ö1á Örij=r0Ü
aÜ Ö1Ü
The rij refers to the Euclidean distance between an infectious farm j and a susceptible farm
i. The ho is the maximum hazard rate, occurring when r0 = 0. The r0 influences how far the
hazard rate extends over distance. The ċ parameter influences the rate of decay in the hazard
rate from the maximum. A dataset for the pairwise Euclidean distances (r) between farms was
created. The distance between farms was calculated using the distGeo function of the geosphere
package in R statistical software version 3.5.3 [36].
To calculate the likelihood function, the force of infection on a susceptible farm i at time t
was given by Eq 2 as described in [34].
liÖtÜ à
X
j6ài
hÖrijÜ 1 âj is infectiousä Ö2Ü
With ĕi(t) as the force of infection or the cumulative hazard rate experienced by farm i on
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day t, the probability that farm i is infected on day t is:
qiÖtÜ à 1  e liÖtÜ Ö3Ü
The probability that farm i remains uninfected up to day t is:
riÖtÜ à e 
Xt 1
sà1
liÖsÜ Ö4Ü
The force of infection (ĕ) towards susceptible farms i on day t depends on the cumulative
number of infectious farms on day t, and the distances between the infectious farms and sus-
ceptible farms. With no infectious farm on day t, the force of infection (ĕ) is zero.
Given the risk of infection above, the log-likelihood function is given by:
‘ à  
X
k✏K
Xtmax 1
tà1
lkÖtÜ  
X
l✏L
Xtcul;l 1
tà1
llÖtÜ  
X
m✏M
Xtinf ;m 1
tà1
lmÖtÜ
á
X
m✏M
logÖ1  e lmÖtinf ;mÜÜ Ö5Ü
where the set K contains all farms that remained uninfected and that were not culled; ö con-
tains the farms that were not infected but that were culled (at times tcul,l); M contains the farms
that were infected (at times tinf,m). With Eq 5, the estimates for the transmission kernel param-
eter values (ho, r0 and ċ) were calculated through maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) as
described in [34] using the 2017 Philippines HPAI epidemic data. The bbmle package of the R
program [36], was used for this procedure. Parameter values were presented in Table 1.
To construct the model, the factors used to account for the species-specific transmissibility
were developed by Hayama (2015) [37], Keeling (2001) [38] and Dorigatti (2010) [18]. The
number of animals in the farm is likewise added to the equation used by Keeling (2001) [38]
and Hayama (2013) [37]. The inclusion of a species-specific transmission coefficient is consid-
ered important if there are variations in susceptibility and the occurrence of infections among
different species, such as is the case with avian influenza. Unfortunately, no further parameters
could be derived from this small dataset.
Following the procedure described by Boender et al. [34], the basic reproduction number
was estimated for each poultry farm in Central Luzon using the spatial transmission kernel
h(rij) and the stochastic infectious period (T) of farms i. The reproductive number of farms
i, Ri, is given by
Ri à
X
j6ài
Ö1  E âe hÖrijÜTiä Ö6Ü
Table 1. Maximum likelihood estimation and 95% confidence intervals of the transmission parameters.
Estimate 95% Confidence interval
h0 (day-1) 0.0012 0.0001–0.1
r0 (km) 3.4 1.001–10.0
ċ 1.4 1.001–5.0
log-likelihood (!) !206.99
AIC 419.98
The parameters ho, r0 and ċ determine the transmission kernel. The ho represents the maximum hazard rate. The r0
influences how far the hazard rate extends over distance. The ċ parameter influences the rate of decay in the hazard
rate from the maximum. The estimates for the transmission kernel parameter values and ċ were calculated through
maximum likelihood estimate.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.t001
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Assumptions
Upon infection, a farm passes through a latency period of 1–2 days [18, 39–41]. In this stage,
infected birds remain non–infectious. This is followed by the start of the infectious period in
which birds become clinically ill. The detection of HPAI in the farm is assumed to be on days
5–7 based on mortality thresholds [42]. We used the mortality threshold because several stud-
ies indicated that the mortality threshold is the most reliable indicator of AI infection in poul-
try farms [43, 44].
Based on the response of farm managers to the survey, the authorities will be notified of the
presence of the disease 5–7 days after detection. Culling of the infected farm is initiated 1–3
days after receiving the notification. According to the outbreak data, the BAI was notified
about the occurrence of unusually high bird mortalities from the index farm in July, 2017.
Culling was only initiated on August 2, 2017. The delay can be attributed to the required pro-
cess of confirming for the presence of HPAI as this is the first time the country experienced
HPAI outbreak. Beyond August 9, infected farms were culled 1–3 days post notification. The
2017 HPAI outbreak data is provided as supplementary. The days required for completion of
the culling of infected farms after reporting were 1–3 days, depending on the size of the farm.
Specifically, for farms with a population 50,000, the culling needs 1 day; for farms with
50,000 < population 100,000, the culling needs 2 days; for farms with population > 100,000,
the culling needs 3 days. The infectious period lasts until the completion of culling. It is also
assumed that birds die only from HPAI infection or culling. The bird population in each farm
is assumed to be at its maximum capacity.
Poultry farms with reproductive ratio (Ri)  1 were classified as high-risk farms. In con-
trast, farms with Ri< 1 have reduced the probability of transmitting HPAI to other farms.
Thus, they can be managed without pre-emptive culling of neighboring farms [34]. The calcu-
lated Ri for each farm included in this study is provided as supplementary material.
Simulations
Simulation was done by randomly selecting a high-risk farm as the index. Using the runif com-
mand of the R software [36], 100 farms were selected to serve as index farms. An index farm
was assumed to be at latent stage (E) at the beginning of the simulation. Each outbreak sce-
nario was simulated using 1,000 iterations. Outbreak simulations were based on a discrete
time step of 1 day. The simulation was performed using R Software with the foreach and
doParallel packages [36].
The control strategies were listed in Table 2. The 1kmPEC was used as the reference strat-
egy. An outbreak was seeded at each index farm in turn. Epidemic outcomes were summarized
Table 2. Control strategies used when simulating HPAI spread in Central Luzon, Philippines.
Strategy Description
0.5kmPEC Pre-emptive culling of farms within 0.5 km from an infected farm
1kmPEC Pre-emptive culling of farms within 1.0 km from an infected farm
1.5kmPEC Pre-emptive culling of farms within 1.5 km from an infected farm
2kmPEC Pre-emptive culling of farms within 2.0 km from an infected farm
2.5kmPEC Pre-emptive culling of farms within 2.5 km from an infected farm
3kmPEC Pre-emptive culling of farms within 3.0 km from an infected farm
NPEC No pre-emptive culling with reporting between 5 to 7 days after detection
NPEC24 No pre-emptive culling. Reporting to authorities is done within 24 hours after detection
NPEC48 No pre-emptive culling. Reporting to authorities is done within 48 hours after detection
NPEC72 No pre-emptive culling. Reporting to authorities is done within 72 hours after detection
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.t002
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as the total number of infected farms, the total number of depopulated farms, and epidemic
duration. The total number of depopulated farms refers to the summation of infected farms
and the pre-emptively culled farms. It is assumed that an infected farm is being depopulated.
Epidemic duration refers to the difference between the dates of the first infection and final
culling. Spatial maps showing the progression of the epidemic for each strategy were generated
using QGIS [43] to visually present their impact on HPAI outbreaks starting with a single
infected farm.
Epidemic size and duration were evaluated for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The
Kruskal -Wallis test was used to compare the epidemic outcomes. The level of statistical signifi-
cance was set at P< 0.05. Input values for the different parameters were changed in the sensi-
tivity analysis to evaluate their influence on the modeling results.
Results
The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the simulation data was not normally distributed. There-
fore, the Kruskal Wallis test was performed. Tables 3–5 showed the results of different control
strategies. The spatio-temporal progression of the HPAI epidemic under different control
strategies were presented in Figs 2 and 3.
Table 3. Comparison of the number of infected poultry farms estimated for the different control strategies.
Strategies Median Mean 95% Confidence Interval
1kmPEC 8 11 e 9 13
0.5kmPEC 28 28 f 23 32
1.5kmPEC 5 6 g 5 7
2kmPEC 4 5 ghij 4 6
2.5kmPEC 4 5 gij 4 5
3kmPEC 4 4 gj 4 5
NPEC 268 230bc 206 253
NPEC24 5 72 defgh 51 92
NPEC48 328 252a 222 282
NPEC72 275 242 b 218 266
Means with different superscripts in each column were statistically different.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.t003
Table 4. Comparison of the total number of poultry farms culled estimated for the different control strategies.
Strategies Median Mean 95% Confidence Interval
1kmPEC 118 134 j 117 150
0.5kmPEC 176 141 hj 121 162
1.5kmPEC 135 142gj 129 154
2kmPEC 185 179 f 168 190
2.5kmPEC 199 201 de 191 211
3kmPEC 220 203 d 191 216
NPEC 268 230 bc 206 253
NPEC24 5 72 k 51 92
NPEC48 328 252 a 222 282
NPEC72 275 242 b 218 266
Means with different superscripts in each column were statistically different.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.t004
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The reference strategy (1kmPEC) generated an epidemic scenario with 134 (95% CI: 117–
150) culled farms including 11 (95% CI: 9–13) infected poultry farms representing to 0.95%
of the total number of commercial poultry farms in the region (n = 1,151). This can be inter-
preted that there are 584,595 infected birds. The epidemic was estimated to stop after 39 (35–
44) days.
Lowering the pre-emptive culling radius by 0.5 km significantly increased the number of
infected farms (n = 28; p = 0.00) and duration of the epidemic (n = 56 days; p = 0.00). None-
theless, the total number of culled farms was comparable (p = 0.92). In contrast, increasing
the radius to 1.5 km significantly reduced the number of infected farms (n = 6; p = 0.00) and
the duration of the epidemic (n = 30; p = 0.00). The total number of culled farms is likewise
comparable with the estimates in the reference strategy. The strategies with wider PEC radii
Table 5. Comparison of the duration (days) of HPAI epidemic scenario estimated for the different control
strategies.
Strategies Median Mean 95% Confidence Interval
1kmPEC 33 39 e 35 44
0.5kmPEC 64 56 d 50 63
1.5kmPEC 27 30 fgh 27 33
2kmPEC 25 27 gh 24 29
2.5kmPEC 25 26 hi 23 28
3kmPEC 24 24 i 21 26
NPEC 125 117 ab 106 128
NPEC24 28 57 cdefgh 46 68
NPEC48 125 111 b 100 123
NPEC72 141 123 a 112 133
Means with different superscripts in each column were statistically different.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.t005
Fig 2. Comparison of the spatio-temporal progression of HPAI epidemic managed with pre-emptive culling at various radius from infected
farms. Colored dots represent the totality of infected and pre-emptively culled farms according to the duration of the epidemic.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.g002
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(2kmPEC, 2.5kmPEC, 3kmPEC) significantly reduced the number of infected farms to around
5 farms and the duration of the outbreak to less than a month. The total number of culled
farms increased to as much as 200 farms.
With no pre-emptive culling implemented (NPEC), the epidemic was estimated to infect
230 (95% CI: 206–253) farms in 117 (95% CI: 106–128) days. These estimates were significantly
higher compared to the numbers of all strategies with pre-emptive culling. The number of
infected farms under the NPEC24 scenario has estimates comparable to the pre-emptive cull-
ing from 0.5 to 2 km radii. The total number of culled farms (n = 72; 51–92) was significantly
lower compared to the rest of the strategies evaluated. The duration of the epidemic was esti-
mated at 57 (95% CI: 46–68) days. This result was comparable to the estimates for the strategies
with pre-emptive culling implemented from 0.5 to 2.0 km radii.
Spatio-temporal characteristics of HPAI epidemic
The spatial maps showing the progression of the HPAI epidemic from a single infectious farm
for each strategy were presented in Figs 2 and 3. The generated risk map according to the farm
level reproductive numbers is presented in Fig 4. The towns of Candaba and San Luis have at
least 1.0 Ri values. Thus, these towns are considered as high-risk zones (HRZ) (Fig 4). With
0.5kmPEC (Fig 2), the HPAI epidemic reached Nueva Ecija and Bulacan within 30 days.
Within 120 days, the epidemic reached Zambales and Bataan provinces. With 1kmPEC (Fig
2), the epidemic affected only Pampanga. In 30 days, the epidemic spread to 1 municipality
outside Candaba and San Luis. In 60 days, the epidemic spread to 3 municipalities outside the
high-risk zone. With 1.5kmPEC (Fig 2), HPAI epidemic spread to 2 municipalities outside the
HRZ in 60 days. The rest of the PEC strategies (Fig 2) limited the epidemic in the HRZ and
stopped within 30 days.
Fig 3. Comparison of the spatio-temporal progression of HPAI epidemic managed with no pre-emptive culling at
various reporting period. Colored dots represent infected farms according to the duration of the epidemic.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.g003
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For NPEC strategy (Fig 3), the epidemic spread in the provinces of Pampanga, Bataan, and
Bulacan within 30 days. In 60 days, infection further spread to the Nueva Ecija province. The
epidemic spread further to other municipalities in the 90 and 120- days scenario. The epidemic
is limited in the municipalities of Pampanga for the NPEC24 (Fig 3) 30-days scenario. The epi-
demic reached Bulacan within 60 days. The NPEC48 (Fig 3) and NPEC72 (Fig 3) have similar
spatio-temporal spread characteristics with NPEC affecting the provinces of Pampanga,
Bataan, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija.
Sensitivity analyses
Sensitivity analyses were done for the latent period, detection time, notification time, and the
parameter values for the transmission kernel. To minimize the number of comparisons, we
compared the magnitude and duration of the epidemic with the reference scenario only.
Extending the latent period up to 5 days does not have any significant impact on the results
we obtained from the 1–2 days latent period. A significant decrease in the mean duration
(p = 0.001) and the number of infected farms (p = 0.02) were observed if HPAI infection is
detected on the 3rd day post-infection. Detection on the 4rth day did not change the results of
our assumptions. Though ideal, detection on the 3rd day is challenging. The clinical signs of
avian influenza can also be observed among other endemic poultry diseases such as Newcastle
disease and fowl cholera. The laboratory process to confirm HPAI infection likewise may surpass
the 3rd day post-infection period. Earlier notification (1, 2, 3 days post-detection) significantly
decreased the mean duration and the number of infected farms compared to our assumption
(5–7 days). This is an important finding as the simple act of early reporting can limit the spread
of the disease and protect the industry. We compared our derived transmission kernel estimates
to the calculations of Boender et al. [34]. No significant difference was observed.
The scenario for the change in the time of reporting to authorities upon detection of HPAI
presence in the farm was included in the variation of the NPEC strategy. Only the 24 hours
reporting post-detection was found to change the estimates of the NPEC (Table 3).
Discussion
The HPAI spread was simulated using a spatial transmission kernel. The transmission kernel
was derived from the profiles of the 23 farms infected during the 2017 HPAI epidemic in the
Fig 4. Risk map of HPAI transmission in Central Luzon, Philippines; a) map showing the provinces in Central
Luzon (b) map showing the towns within the high risk zone.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238815.g004
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Philippines. It is acknowledged that the results of this modeling should be used with caution,
since only this single outbreak may be used to generate the transmission kernel, and farm loca-
tions and disease events could have been underreported.
In this study, the effectiveness of 10 different control strategies for managing HPAI epidem-
ics were compared. Strategies include culling only the infected farm, and implementation of
pre-emptive culling within various radial distances from the infected farm. The size (number
of infected and pre-emptively culled farms) and duration of the epidemic were used for the
comparisons. The estimates should not be interpreted as the exact number of farms that would
be affected by a HPAI epidemic in Central Luzon. Simulation models can only provide a range
of results as a reference for the likely size of the epidemic under each scenario.
The current government strategy (1km PEC) was used as the reference for comparison.
Results showed that the current contingency program does not need modifications in high
risk zones. The simulations indicate that there was no advantage in changing the PEC radiuses.
Reducing the PEC radius to 0.5 km increased the number of infected farms, and the number
of depopulated farms therefore increased. The same was observed for scenarios where the PEC
radii were increased. The number of infected farms was reduced but these strategies required a
wider area of pre-emptive culling. Eventually, the total number of farms culled increased. The
duration of the epidemic estimated under the reference scenario can be further reduced to less
than a month through the implementation of a wider PEC radius which will also mean that
more farms will be depopulated. The implementation of pre-emptive culling from 2 to 3 km
radius resulted to less than 30 days duration but increased the number of farms required to be
culled. On the other hand, without pre-emptive culling (NPEC), the epidemic lasted longer
(117 days) with significantly higher number of culled farms (n = 230; 206–253).
Livestock authorities face the decision-making dilemma for which outbreak response objec-
tive should be prioritized when selecting the optimal strategy. Ideally, the strategy should result
in eradication of the disease as soon as possible with minimal numbers of animals culled. Nev-
ertheless, these two objectives are competing. As shown by our results, the 3kmPEC was more
effective in reducing the outbreak duration than the reference strategy. This would mean that
trade restrictions could be lifted earlier benefitting exporters and local traders of poultry prod-
ucts. But the economic burden for farmers in the culling zone and the cost associated with the
implementation of wide scale culling may be too high. The NPEC strategy prolongs the dura-
tion of the epidemic and resulted in a higher number of infected farms. The selection of the
most appropriate strategy is therefore difficult and has to consider several variables and the
weighting of each outbreak response objective varies between countries and within regions in
countries.
During the HPAI epidemic, the BAI implemented the 1kmPEC strategy in Pampanga prov-
ince. Our results showed that BAI’s strategy was effective and is likely to have been economi-
cally acceptable, because changing the culling radius either way (0.5kmPEC and 1.5kmPEC)
did not significantly reduce the size of the epidemic in terms of number of farms affected. The
duration is reduced by 9 days if the 1.5kmPEC strategy is implemented. But this reduction is
not enough to justify culling 8 additional farms. It is ideal to implement a strategy that can
immediately stop disease spread. This objective is given much weight for public health dis-
eases. Economics is another variable considered in selecting the best strategy against non-zoo-
notic diseases.
The outbreak observed in Nueva Ecija was managed using the NPEC strategy. The decision
to shift to this approach may have been due to mounting pressure from the affected stakehold-
ers against the implementation of PEC. Fortunately, our analysis on the farm level reproduc-
tive ratio (Ri) showed that farms outside the towns of San Luis and Candaba, Pampanga
have Ri< 1. The Ri refers to the average number of farms that an infected farm will infect
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throughout its infectious period. If the Ri is  1, a self-sustaining epidemic is to be expected.
Otherwise, the disease will not spread [35, 37, 44]. Thus, culling of the infected farm only is
sufficient. There are no benefits of implementing pre-emptive culling if the Ri is low. Thus,
a key factor in identifying which control strategy is the most appropriate depends on where
the outbreak occurs. The calculated farm level Ri values presented in Fig 4 can be used in the
future to decide if pre-emptive culling should be implemented in the event of HPAI outbreaks.
Technically, the use of the NPEC strategy outside the high-risk zone is generally favorable
for the stakeholders. The high-risk areas identified in this study are concentrated only in Can-
daba and San Luis towns of Pampanga province. Hence, the NPEC strategy can be used in
managing the HPAI outbreak outside these towns. However, using different strategies in dif-
ferent parts of a province can be perceived by poultry raisers whose premises were depopulated
as an unfair treatment. To address this issue, the veterinary authority needs to develop a strong
trust relationship with local farmers and veterinarians before HPAI outbreak events. Future
modelling studies on this subject should also include a simulation scenario combining NPEC
and pre-emptive culling with the calculated Ri as a determinant. For instance, the control strat-
egy can be initiated using pre-emptive culling and will automatically shift to the NPEC strategy
for farms with Ri 1.0.
The NPEC strategy can be implemented discretely. Thus, public panic can be avoided.
During the early stage of the 2017 HPAI epidemic, pre-emptive culling strategy was used.
The market price of poultry products declined drastically. This can be attributed to public
concerns about consuming poultry because of the zoonotic potential of the disease [45–47].
Though the HPAI strain was later announced to be harmless, the stigma of the term” bird
flu” heightened public fear to eat poultry products. Even poultry raisers outside the outbreak
zone suffered economic losses because of the decreased demand. The market price of
chicken started to normalize by October, 2017 [48]. During this period, the BAI kept on
identifying other infected poultry farms outside the towns of San Luis and Candaba, Pam-
panga. At this stage of the outbreak, the NPEC strategy is being implemented. Despite the
continuous implementation of the NPEC strategy, the public may not be able to monitor
the progress of the outbreak. Eventually, the previous public fear stopped and start consum-
ing poultry products again.
The NPEC24 resulted in the smallest outbreak in terms of the estimated number of affected
farms (72; 51–92). The mean duration (57 days) was also comparable (p = 0.86) to the refer-
ence scenario (39 days). These numbers are likewise significantly reduced for the reference sce-
nario (1 km PEC) if reporting to authorities is done within the first 3 days after the detection.
These observations highlight the crucial role of livestock keepers in animal disease manage-
ment. They are the vanguard of defense against disease outbreaks as they are in the position to
lose the most. This means it should be a priority to incentivize farm managers to immediately
notify the BAI upon detection of HPAI. Research such as conducted by Wright (2016) [49] is
needed to identify locally relevant factors influencing farmers’ reporting behaviors which will
then allow developing strategies to increase engagement. Their results showed that perceptions
of responsibility and trust are the main factors in determining if farmers will alert government
to suspicious clinical signs of disease. Based on the results of the HPAI outbreak investigation,
the BAI was only approached by the affected farm owners after poultry consultants had not
been able to solve the observed unusual bird mortalities. Thus, the BAI should be recognized
to have the expertise to diagnose and effectively manage poultry diseases. Of similar impor-
tance is enhancing the capability of farmers to detect the possible presence of avian influenza
in their respective farms. The public awareness campaign used in the eradication efforts
against Foot and Mouth Disease can be adopted. In the FMD program, a school on the air
(SOA) radio training programs for pig producers was conducted. The training covered topics
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on principles of disease recognition, reporting, diagnosis and control, plus improving hygiene
and sanitation procedures [50].
A key part of effective outbreak management is lowering the possibility of disease transmis-
sion to susceptible farms. Neighbors of infected farms have a higher risk of becoming infected.
Even with the implementation of movement restriction and increased biosecurity, between–
farm transmission through untraced contacts (“neighborhood infections”) still occurs, as has
been shown during epidemics of avian influenza [51], foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) [38, 52],
and classical swine fever [53–55]. To address this issue, farms around infected farms are usu-
ally either depopulated or vaccinated. The culling of farms located close to infected premises
was implemented in the 2001 FMD epidemic in the United Kingdom. It was assumed that
exposure to infection from neighboring infected premises occurred. Simulation analysis
showed that this strategy resulted to fewer farms losing livestock [56]. Pre-emptive culling
reduces local density of susceptible farms, thereby resulting in a decrease in the local reproduc-
tive ratio [56]. The 2016–2017 avian influenza epidemic in the Republic of Korea was managed
through pre-emptive culling around infected premises with radius extending up to 3 km [57].
The management of the 2004 HPAI epidemic in Thailand likewise included pre-emptive cull-
ing. Initially, the radius from infected farms extend up to 5 km. It was later decreased to 1 km
radius [58]. Likewise, pre-emptive culling involving high number of birds was performed dur-
ing the HPAI epidemics in Vietnam [59].
Although the model supports the current HPAI contingency protocol for dealing with
future outbreaks in high-risk areas, the implementation of pre-emptive culling is challenging.
Stakeholders may not accept this approach due to its adverse economic effects. In fact, despite
the epidemiological effectiveness of pre-emptive culling, large -scale depopulation of healthy
animals has become increasingly unpopular in the public [60, 61]. Opposition from veterinari-
ans, farm owners, and residents was reported by Bouma [44]. The evaluation of the policy for
the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom [62] indicated that “there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the effectiveness of 3-km pre-emptive culling as a control procedure”. The
PEC strategy also requires enough manpower to meet the logistic demand of implementing
the culling zone policy. Animals with high genetic values may be sacrificed. Biological pollu-
tion is also possible. The high number of carcass to be buried in an area can result to high vol-
ume of leachates. Burning as a method of carcass disposal can cause the release of dioxin in the
atmosphere [28].
An alternative to the pre-emptive culling strategy is vaccination. It is more acceptable
socio-politically [61, 63]. The outbreaks of FMD in Japan [64] and South Korea [65] were suc-
cessfully managed using early vaccination. Vaccination against HPAI if combined with strict
surveillance was shown to be effective in reducing the risk of further outbreaks [66, 67]. The
susceptibility of vaccinated flocks is reduced because of the decreased transmission rate [1].
Vietnam [59], Hong Kong [68] and Italy [69] have included emergency vaccination in their
contingency programs against HPAI.
The Philippines was successful in eradicating FMD without the implementation of pre-
emptive culling. Control strategies implemented include quarantine and animal movement
controls, strategic vaccination, surveillance and disease investigation, and enhanced public
awareness with school on the air radio programs [50]. Poultry producers may likewise
expect a more “acceptable” strategy for dealing with HPAI outbreaks. A mutually “accept-
able” strategy can only be defined after the concerns of both the government and the poultry
raisers are addressed. Factors to be considered in succeeding modelling research for HPAI
in the Philippines may include vaccination, required resources such as manpower, and eco-
nomic impact. A hybrid of PEC and NPEC strategies in which the management is depen-
dent on the farm level reproductive number. For instance, the control strategy can be
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initiated using pre-emptive culling and will automatically shift to the NPEC strategy for
farms with Ri 1.0.
Conclusions
In this study, a spatial transmission kernel was used to explore the impacts of different HPAI
outbreak control strategies. The results of these simulations provided estimates of epidemic
size and duration for each of the control strategies considered. We also emphasized that the
control strategy to be implemented is dependent on the calculated farm level reproductive
number (Ri). With that information, it was possible to define high risk areas where the imple-
mentation of the reference strategy (1kmPEC) was optimal. In contrast, those occurring in
low-risk areas could have been managed effectively using the NPEC strategy. Thus, the stan-
dard 1-km PEC protocol is not epidemiologically and socio-economically optimal for the
whole region because of the variation in the reproductive number.
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